

VZCZCXYZ0001
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHAD #0053 0340859
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 030859Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0239
INFO RHEFHLC/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUCNFB/FBI WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI

C O N F I D E N T I A L ABU DHABI 000053

NOFORN
SIPDIS
STATE FOR S/RAP, NEA AND INL
PASS ONDP FOR DIRECTOR
OSD FOR WECHSLER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/03
TAGS: [PREL](#) [KTIA](#) [EFIN](#) [PTER](#) [AE](#)
SUBJECT: Moving the MLAT Issue with the UAE

REF: ABU DHABI 0164

CLASSIFIED BY: Richard Olson, Ambassador; REASON: 1.4(B), (D)

11. (SBU) This is an action request, see para 7.

12. (SBU) We have greatly expanded our law enforcement cooperation with the UAE over the past five years, and are likely to enhance it further, not least because of the increasing importance of law enforcement issues in Afghanistan. Our law enforcement team in Mission UAE has built good contacts with UAEG authorities, but we have reached the limits of what we can do with informal working arrangements. We need an MLAT.

13. (SBU) After a flurry of hope that the UAE might have reversed its longstanding policy of linking an MLAT to two other agreements (an Extradition Treaty and a Treaty on Legal and Judicial Assistance in Civil and Commercial Matters), the Minister of Justice reconfirmed to Ambassador that the UAE insists on negotiating a package of three (reftel).

14. (SBU) As we understand it, Washington is eager to negotiate an MLAT, sees no major obstacles to a civil/commercial treaty, but has reservations about negotiating an extradition treaty when, as is the case in the UAE, the host nation refuses to extradite its own nationals. Because of its stance on extraditing nationals, the UAE has been low on the priority list for US negotiating teams. We believe that decision should be revisited, for two interrelated reasons.

15. (SBU) First, the peculiar demographics of the UAE. Eighty percent of the overall population (and 90 percent of the workforce) is expatriate. This means that a properly crafted bilateral treaty would cover 80-90 percent of the population. This would seem to be of significant value to the USG.

16. (C/NF) Second, amongst the expatriate population are significant numbers of Indians, Pakistanis, and Afghans (probably over 2 million in total). While most are simple laborers, the fact is that there is likely to be hidden in their midst supporters of

the Taliban and LeT, drug kingpins, and Indians with links to the Bombay underworld. Moreover, Iranian proliferators, Hamas facilitators, and Russian money launderers (some of whom are indicted in pending USG cases) are to be found. While Dubai is the hub for legitimate commerce in the Gulf, it is, unfortunately, also a hub for illegitimate trade. An MLAT would give us more tools to exchange information on law enforcement issues, including those related to terrorism , the illegal arms trade and illicit finance.

17. (SBU) Action Request: we request that through the Illicit Finance Task Force, the Interagency review the decision not to pursue an extradition treaty with the UAE.
OLSON